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**TOTAL FORCE POLICY
A STRUCTURE FOR THE FUTURE**

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PREFACE

This research paper is in partial fulfillment of the curriculum for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). ICAF is one of five elements of the National Defense University located at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. The other elements are The National War College, Armed Forces Staff College, Information Resources Management College, and Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Col Danny W. Hamilton, USAFR, is the primary researcher. Col Hamilton is an Air Force Academy graduate who spent 11 years on active duty before separating from the Air Force. He joined the Air Force Reserve and served as a Reservist for 9 years. In 1988, he returned to active duty under USC, Title 10, section 265. Col Hamilton is a member of ICAF Class of 1996.

The following students provided frames of reference for other services: Cdr Craig Groom, Naval Reserve; and Lt. Col Jim Snyder, Army Reserve. Dr. John Bokel is the ICAF faculty advisor.

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- Footnotes also provide hyperlinks. Double clicking on a footnote jumps to that footnote. Double clicking on the footnote number takes you back to the footed area of text.

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War has caused dramatic changes in our armed forces including significant downsizing that affects Active, National Guard, and Reserve components. As we downsizing, we are also looking for ways to increase efficiency and capability. An obvious way to increase efficiency is to reduce duplications of function. Increasing capability as we downsize is difficult; however, improving integration of our forces can increase capability without affecting structure. Reducing duplication and improving integration should be part of all decisions regarding the relative size of the Active and Reserve forces.

An analysis of Active and reserve component structures identifies duplications in command, administration , and support functions between the Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces. Within the National Guard, these functions are under the control of the individual state making it very difficult to affect change. Between the Active and Reserve structures, the Reserve structure is the logical candidate for change.

After considering alternatives for changes to the Reserve structure, this study builds a conceptual model that merges the Active and Reserve structures as the best alternative for eliminating duplication while improving integration of forces. Merging these forces provides additional benefits from more efficient use of high value assets and a more adaptable structure to balance the relative size of Active and Reserve forces.

Interviews and consultations with other service members were used to identify obstacles and implementation issues. Although there do not appear to be any insurmountable obstacles, cultural differences may be the most difficult obstacle to overcome. Reserve representation within leadership positions is identified as the only way to overcome this obstacle. Implementation issues revolve around the inertia of the system. The magnitude of the change makes it difficult for the system to accept. Successful implementation will depend on change from within.

Recommendations included test cases implementing the new structure in units transitioning to new weapon systems such as the F-22, presentation of this model at the next Bottom Up Review (BUR) sometime after the presidential elections, and additional studies verifying cost savings and integration benefits in preparation for the BUR.

INTRODUCTION

“Change is the law of life. And those that look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future. “

John F. Kennedy

The end of the Cold War, budget pressures, and organizational reform force changes to our military that are described as the Revolution in Military Affairsⁱ. The Revolution includes major downsizing of our military forces even though “Operations Other Than War”ⁱⁱ keep our military engaged overseas. The drive to reduce the budget without losing capability forces some very difficult decisions. Most of the budget decisions revolve around readiness of forces versus procurement of new systems; however, as budget pressures continue, further reductions in force structure seem inevitable. Questions raised regarding duplications between Active, Reserve and National Guard forces suggest that further reductions are likely to feature the Active and National Guard components competing for Reserve structure.

PRESERVING RESERVE CAPABILITY

Our Reserve forces contribute to Total Force capabilities in peacetime and in time of war. Any changes to the Reserve structure must maintain these capabilities.

METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS STUDY

The methodology used for this study includes analysis of current Reserve force structure, identification of alternatives, and selection of one alternative for detailed analysis. A conceptual structure was used in interviews with Department of Defense leaders to identify potential benefits and obstacles to implementation.

Interviews conducted with civilian and military officials within the Department of Defense’s Reserve offices were used to gain insight into obstacles and implementation issues. The selected alternative was

presented for comment then specific questions were asked regarding viability, implementation issues, and potential strategies for gaining consensus. All interviews were conducted on a non-attribution basis.

Although the study focuses on the Air Force, ICAF students from the Army and Navy Reserve were asked to provide inputs to gain insight into service issues.

The Internet was used as a primary source for material. References, including hyperlinks, to Internet sources are provided when possible.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The following points are made relative to this paper.

- This study is an individual research effort and is not intended to represent the views of any government agency or military service.
- Although the Air Force appears to be the focus in the paper, it is used in examples because of the author's experience in the Air Force Reserve. The intent is to seek a solution for all services.
- This is not a quantitative analysis. Numbers are notional in nature unless referenced.
- This paper does not address merging our military services. This topic was considered out of scope for this study.
- This paper does not address the civilian work force other than to the extent that they are part of infrastructure.

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Before we identify alternatives for change, it is essential to understand the current structure of our military forces .

BASIS OF OUR STRUCTURE

Our military forces have evolved over time in the Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces.

The National Guard

Prior to the American Revolution, the military structure was built around the “militia”, civilians who took up arms and worked together to defend their communities and properties. The Constitution of the United States affirms the right of every citizen to “bear arms” as part of a “well regulated militia”ⁱⁱⁱ. It also empowers Congress to organize, arm, and discipline the militia and to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. Certain powers remain with the state, such as location of bases, which has led to a certain tension between the federal government and the state governments concerning the use of the National Guard. The term “Guard” will be used to refer to both Army and Air Force components of the National Guard.^{iv}

The Active Duty

The Constitution also gave Congress the right to “raise and support” armies and to “provide and maintain” a navy^v. This provides the basis for national forces in addition to the “militia”. Our national forces have evolved into the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Although the history of each service is not covered here, it is important to point out that each service has developed its’ own tradition and culture as evidenced by the uniforms we wear and the language we use. For the sake of discussion, the active duty forces within the services will be referred to as the “Active Duty” or the “regular component”.

The Reserve Forces

The Reserve elements of our national forces, the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marines Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve, have also evolved over time. The Army Reserve traces its origin to 1908^{vi}, when Congress authorized the establishment of a medical reserve corps that could be ordered to active duty to support the Army. In 1912, Congress authorized an Army Reserve of trained citizen-soldiers, and in 1916 the National Defense Act created the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. The National Defense Act of 1916 also authorized the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, a reserve corps of 2,300 officers and enlisted, thereby originating the air reserve component. The Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve can be traced back to the establishment of a Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps in 1925. Congress established a volunteer service on 23 June 1939 termed "the Coast Guard Reserve". To differentiate from the National Guard, we will use the term "Reserve" with a big "R" to denote these forces. The term "reserve components" refers to both Reserve and Guard components.

THE STRUCTURE TODAY

The structure of our military is governed, to a large extent, by law in the form of our US Codes^{vii}. A militia is still authorized in the US Code, Title 10, sections 311 and 312^{viii}. The militia is divided into two classes: the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia, and the unorganized militia. The unorganized militia consists of all able-bodied males, who are not in the National Guard or the Naval Militia, who are between the age of 17 and 45 years, and who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States. The unorganized militia also includes former "regular" military up to the age of 64 years. The US Code specifically excludes members of the armed forces unless they are not on active duty^{ix}.

US Code, Title 10 governs the rest of our armed forces. Separate sections address the Army^x, Navy and Marine Corps^{xi}, Air Force^{xii}, and Coast Guard^{xiii}. US Code, Title 10 also governs the "Reserve Components"^{xiv}, except that the National Guard is also governed under Title 32^{xv}.

Purpose Of The Reserve Components

The purpose of the reserve components is "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires,"^{xvi}. In actuality, reserve components support operations in peacetime on a continuing basis and reserve recall will be required for almost every major operation.

Reserve Categories

We identify reserve members by categories for recall. Definitions of categories from US Codes^{xvii} can be found in Appendix A and apply to both National Guard and Reserve members. The Selected Reserve are considered our front line reserve forces and are the first to be recalled to duty. Individual Mobility Augmentees (IMA) are assigned to staff and headquarters positions to provide additional manpower to those functions during mobilization. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are primarily members who have recently separated from the military while most of the Retired Reserve is receiving military pensions. The Standby Reserve is a special category used for critical personnel.

The Reserve Components^{xviii} are listed below along with their estimated end strength based on the 1996 Authorization Bill^{xix} and current estimates.

<u>Reserve Component</u>	<u>End Strengths - 1996</u>				Standby	Retired		
	Ready Reserve (Auth - 2,900,000 ^{xvii})		IMA	IRR				
	Selected Reserve	Paid Strength						
Army National Guard	373,000	23,390	25,500					
Air National Guard	112,707	10,066	22,906					
Army Reserve	230,000	11,575	6,630	13,000 ¹	500,000 ¹	13,000 ¹		
Air Force Reserve	73,969	628	9,802	99,000 ¹	103,000 ¹	12,000 ¹		
Naval Reserve	98,894	17,587	0					
Marine Corps Reserve	42,274	2,559	0					
Coast Guard Reserve ²	8,000	0	0					
SUB TOTALS	989,247	65,805	64,838					
TOTALS			1,796,000		 25,600¹ 1,647,600¹ 			

In contrast, the authorized end strengths of the active components is about 1.5 million as follows:

Army - 495,000 Air Force - 388,200 Navy - 428,340 Marine Corps - 174,000

¹ Approximate

² The Coast Guard Auxiliary consists of civilian volunteers and total approximately 35,659 members.

Location Of Reserve Components

The location of National Guard bases within a state is the prerogative of state government to the extent the state is willing to fund moves. Typically, units are spread across the state based on political needs. Air National Guard bases are located at both civilian airports and on Active Duty bases.

Reserve units are located primarily on Active Duty bases.


Command And Control

National Guard forces are under the command and control of the parent state except when placed on Active Duty. All Active Duty forces are under the command and control of the President, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but control is limited by Congress through control of the budget. The Reserve forces are federal forces under the control of the President, through the Secretary of Defense; however control is limited by certain recall restrictions. Congress also controls the Reserve manning levels and budget separate from the Active Duty forces.

Mobilization

The President may call up a maximum of 200,000 Selected Reserve members under US Code section 673b^{xxi} for up to 90 days. Full mobilization of the armed forces must be authorized by Congress and would result in over 5 million men and woman being called to duty in 90 days to 24 months. The first to be called would be the Selected Reserve and certain members of the IRR on the active list. The Standby Reserve can be called after the Ready Reserve. The Retired Reserve would be last. Any member in reserve status can request to serve at the pleasure of the President and service Secretary.

Total Mobilized Force - 5,116,879



How We Perform

Desert Storm provides a check point for how the reserve components are used and how they perform. To some extent, mobilization was hampered by the 200,000 restriction of US Code section 673b until 18 January 1991. In general, units called to duty were able to mobilize on schedule and deploy effectively. The Army, which depends heavily on the reserve components, experienced the most problems, having to train during post mobilization and round out reserve units with active duty equipment and personnel. Reserve components were typically used to backfill units in the states and to provide support units for the war fighters. There have been few complaints about the performance of the reserve forces during Desert Storm; however, the reserve forces experienced several frustrations. The deployment of combat units appeared to be a token to foster the image of Total Force. There was a lack of reserve identity because none of the reserve command structures were utilized. Unit cohesion may have suffered because of the rounding out with active personnel.^{xxii}

REASONS FOR CHANGE

Budget reductions are the most visible reason for downsizing; however, they are not the only reason to change. Congress has directed changes to reduce duplication and provide better integration of our Reserve forces. Studies by notable institutions have also recommended the same kind of changes.

We Are Directed By Congress

To a large extent, Congress controls the structure of our military through the United States Code (USC) and Appropriation Acts.

US Codes Title 10 -- Title 10 directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a Report on Roles and Missions and to consider "Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces" in preparing that report. The Chairman uses the Commission on Roles and Missions for preparation for this report.^{xxiii}

Commission on Roles and Missions -- The May 24, 1995, report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) devotes an entire section entitled "Further Integrate the Reserve Components" to reserve forces.

Five general principles are recommended for “sizing, shaping, and employing the Total Force to better integrate Reserve Components”.^{xxiv} The fifth principle mandates greater integration:

“Fifth, greater integration and cooperation is required between Active and Reserve Components. Seamless integration is the key to effective Reserve support of the Total Force.”^{xxv}

The CORM also recommends pilot programs to encourage innovation.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 -- The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act directs a “Review Of Reserve Component Management Headquarters” as follows:

“(1) The Secretary of Defense shall, within six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, undertake steps to reduce, consolidate, and streamline management headquarters operations of the reserve components.”^{xxvi}

Other Studies Recommend Change

There have been numerous studies done within the last five years that have addressed force structure. These studies have been in response to changes in the world and in the United States. One of the most thorough studies was done by RAND for the Office of the Secretary of Defense titled *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*^{xxvii}. RAND’s study provides a service by service look at force mix focused on near term. The study does not provide hard recommendations and is intended to provide information for comparison of alternative force mixes. Issues addressed include: ability to meet contingencies, peacetime forward presence, and sustainability. The closest that study comes to recommending a new structure is extension of the “Associate Unit” concept in the Army and Air Force. A portion of the final paragraph, “The Need for a More Integrated Total Force”, follows:

“In sum, our model for the future stresses a more integrated and internally cooperative total force that brings active and reserve personnel together in new and innovative ways to build a better and more robust force.... Innovative concepts, such as the associate concept, need to be expanded.... If deterrence fails, the reserves must provide the forces that will enable us to fight and win.”^{xxviii}

Technology Creates And Facilitates Change

Insertion of technology creates opportunities for force reductions by improving capability. The technology also facilitates reductions by improving training as we integrate our forces.

Advanced Weapon Systems Lead To Reductions In Force Structure -- The weapons of tomorrow are more lethal, more survivable, more reliable, than the weapons systems they will replace. A good example is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is being developed as a replacement for the Air Forces F-16, the Navy's EA-6B, F-14, and the Marine AV-8B. The Air Force is now considering less than one-for-one replacement of its F-16s because of the JSF's increased capability with precision guided weapons. Increases in the lethality of our weapon systems will allow further reductions in force structure.

Technology Facilitates Training -- One of the original reasons for having a separate Reserve structure was the difference in training requirements. Today's technology provides tools, such as long distance training and unit training devices, that reduce the need for a separate structure. Long distance training can be used for a significant portion of the administrative training requirements thus allowing Reserve training periods to be focused on operational training and performance of assigned functions. The new weapons systems, like the F-22 and JSF, will also have sophisticated unit level training devices which enable crews to schedule their own training.

Advances In Information Warfare Enhance Integration -- The battlefield of the future will include significant C⁴I assets designed to connect all players on the battlefield. These assets provide unit location for battlefield management and targeting information used for execution of battle plans. As other nations develop Information Warfare capabilities, seams in the command and control structure of our forces create opportunities for exploitation. These seams also make it more difficult to move the information between units and command levels.

Computerization Reduces Administrative Structure -- The single most expensive area of duplication is administrative functions. Managing personnel recruiting, assignments, and pay is probably the most expensive and work-intensive part of administration. Computers are available today that can easily handle both Active and Reserve component requirements in these areas, especially when you consider personnel reductions taking place as we downsize. Technology available in 10 years should allow integration of Active and Reserve component administrative functions with additional reductions in administrative manpower.

SELECTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE

Three alternatives are considered to reform the Reserve component using two criteria: reduction of duplication; and increased integration of forces.

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION

Congress directs consideration of unnecessary duplication when considering Roles and Missions and the CORM has called for “greater integration”. When combined with studies calling for more integration, it is obvious that the criteria for change must be reduced duplication and improved integration.

Reducing Duplications In Structure

In order to maintain pre-mobilization administration and control, duplications have developed between reserve and active components. On the administration side, duplication exists primarily in recruiting and personnel administrative activities. On the command side, duplication exists for two reasons; command and control of reserve components in peacetime and augmentation of active command structures after mobilization. These duplications provide opportunities to increase efficiency if they can be eliminated without effecting capability.

Providing Better Integration

Integration of forces is one of the key elements of modern warfare. In the past, integration of Reserve units occurred at the unit level as Reserve units were recalled to duty and placed within the Active command structure. This created seams in the command and control function that took time to work out. Today’s technology makes any seam a weakness to be exploited. Considering reduced reaction times, integration within the command and control area is therefore a critical issue.

ALTERNATIVES

The prominence of the Active forces and the political clout of the National Guard force changes upon the Reserve component of our forces. Three alternatives for changing the Reserve structure are considered in

this study: change within the existing structure; merging the Reserve into the National Guard; and merging the Reserve into the Active Duty.

Change Within The Existing Structure

Studies have recommended “Associate Unit” concept as a way of improving integration within the existing Reserve structure.^{xxix} The Associate concept reduces duplication at the wing level and creates efficiencies by combining support functions; however, the Associate concept does not reduce duplication above the wing level.

Integration is improved by having units work directly with their active counterparts, but unit members still belong to the Reserve causing command and control issues. Recent attempts to create Fighter Associate units within the Air Combat Command met with resistance supposedly because of these issues.

Taking the Associate unit concept to the extreme, one might suggest turning all Reserve units into associate units and eliminating the command and support structures. Although this might work initially, the absence of Reserve representation within the command structure puts the Reserve culture at risk. When combined with lack of career paths for Reserve personnel above the unit level, there is a possibility that retention and recruiting would not be sufficient to sustain the force structure.

Merging The Reserves With The National Guard

There have been suggestions that the National Guard could absorb the Reserve personnel and equipment to form a single reserve component. This option eliminates duplication in command and support structure, but leaves unresolved the command structure required to augment the Active forces after mobilization.

This alternative does not improve integration between the active and reserve components and may hurt integration in existing Associate units. The Air National Guard has considered the Associate unit concept in the past and has been unable to work through the command and control issues.

Taken to the extreme there has been discussion of “Reverse Associate” units in the National Guard where Active Duty personnel would be assigned to Guard units. Exact relationships with the state command

structure are unknown and this concept has not been able to work itself through the command and control issues.

Merging The Reserves With The Active Duty

Merging Reserve personnel and equipment with the Active Duty eliminates duplication, improves integration, and creates efficiencies in operation. Merging the command structures also eliminates duplication in headquarters functions without losing the augmentation required after mobilization. This alternative is so attractive that it is surprising that it is not found in any of the referenced studies.

This alternative provides the best integration possible between Active and Reserve personnel with the only issue being the merging of the different cultures. The key to success in the merging of these cultures, or having them live side-by-side, is a command structure that includes both Active and Reserve leadership.

RECOMMENDATION - MERGE RESERVE AND ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

Of the alternatives addressed, merging the Reserve with the Active Duty satisfies the criteria best. Unnecessary duplication is eliminated by merging command structure while administration and support functions are . Augmentation of command functions for mobilization is maintained by expanding Active command structure with Reserve personnel. Integration is no longer an issue except for cultural differences which can be addressed by the integration of Reserve and Active Duty leadership.

DESCRIBING THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

Merging our Reserve forces with the Active requires major changes to structure, personnel policies, and culture. A conceptual model for the proposed structure is developed to identify benefits, disadvantages, and issues for implementation

STRUCTURE

This model proposes a new structure that completely changes the way we organize our reserve forces. The new structure is presented from the bottom up with the unit level presented first to firmly establish the concept. The same model is then applied to service and unified command elements. Administrative and support elements are considered to the extent that they remain unique to the individual services.

The Basic Concept

The basic concept for this model is an integrated force composed of both full-time, Active, and part-time, Reserve, personnel. The mix goes from the bottom to the top, from the lowest rank to the highest rank. Reserve representation in the higher officer and enlisted ranks provides career paths and insures that the Reserve members will not feel subservient to the Active members. In general terms, peace time operations would be an 8 hour a day operation. During deployments there would be sufficient personnel to run a 24 hour operation.

The system would be adaptable in that the desired ratio could be readjusted for long term changes in operational tempo^{xxx}. In the extreme, units could be "mothballed" by reducing the number of active members to a caretaker minimum and reducing the participation of Reserve members to a reduced state of readiness.

Reserve categories would remain basically the same as they are today, except that there would be no active positions. Members of the Selected Reserve would participate a minimum of 62 training periods a year and would be the first tier for mobilization. IMA members, who would train less than the Selected Reserve, would be assigned to the unit to provide the second tier of mobilization and a structure to support mobilization of follow-on reservists. IRR members would be assigned to units to provide second tier augmentation and the

bulk of the third tier of mobilization. Standby Reserves would be used to provide mobilization of core competencies not available in Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve membership. Retired Reserves would be available on a volunteer basis for any mobilization and would provide the bulk of the training assets for training new forces in the case of full mobilization.

The system would allow movement between Active and Reserve positions based on personal needs and performance. Retirement rules would be changed to reflect current social values and to provide incentives for participation.

Organization at the Unit Level

At the lowest level the force will have a large percentage of first term members, enlisted and/or officers who are serving their initial enlistment. The number would depend on the number of enlistments required to sustain the force. Most of the first term enlistments would be recruited for continued active duty, but there may be opportunities to recruit directly into the Reserve side for some job fields such as the medical and computer fields.

During normal day-to-day operations the full-time Active personnel would operate the unit. Reserve personnel in the command structure would participate at the same level as our current aviation units, approximately 126 days a year, and would participate in day-to-day activities and operate the unit on reserve training weekends required once each month. All deployments would be supported by a mix of active and Reserve members to the maximum extent possible. In time of conflict or increased alert status, a portion of both active and Reserve members would have the responsibility of training non-ready Reserves called to duty.

Emphasis would be placed on unit tradition with both active and Reserve members. Active members would spend longer tours within the unit. Standby and Retired Reserve members would be given direct links to the unit to foster a sense of history. They would be the gray beards of the unit. During mobilization IRR call up would put priority on placing the member in his/her former unit. The same would hold true for Standby and Retired Reserve members. Unit lists would be maintained for all Reserve categories. The little used “Muster”^{xxx1} clause would be used to bring IRR members into the unit once a year for update on unit and service activities. Those members of the IRR that are required to maintain physical condition would be tested

as part of "Muster Day" activities. The Muster clause might also be changed to include the Standby and Retired Reserves.

Integration Into The Command Structure

The command structure is critical to the success of combined Active and Reserve units. Experience in the Reserve forces indicates that part-time reservists, led by an active duty command structure, increases the risks of clashes of cultures. Within the Reserves today we control this aspect by sharing leadership positions between Active and Reserve members. Reserve positions in leadership are also necessary for career progression of the Reserve members.

Units -- If the commander of a unit is an Active officer, his/her deputy would be a Reserve part-timer who would fill in for the commander when he/she is gone, pull second shift during exercises, run weekend training, and command the unit at home when the unit deploys. Our current Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units follow this structure except that Reserve members in active status are used instead of Active members.

Services Commands -- The same arguments used at the operational command level apply up the chain to the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff. The model is to take the command structure that currently supports the Reserve forces directly and place those functions and positions within the Active structure as Reserve positions. These positions would be Selected Reserve with sufficient availability to cover Reserve specific issues and augment the staffs during crisis. These personnel would be essential for any major mobilization. Today, we have IMAs assigned at almost all levels of command within the services. In many cases these individuals are underutilized or ineffective because of their limited availability.

Unified Commands - It is critical to include Reserve manning at the CINC level where our forces are brought into action. The CINC and his staff are really the extension of the unit command level for actual operations. Reserve members would perform the same type of functions as the unit level command. For instance, when a hot spot develops within a CINC's area, the CINC could focus on the problem at hand while the Deputy CINC, a Reservist, and the Reserve staff provide additional support where needed.

Units assigned overseas would have Reserves assigned to the maximum extent possible. One of the biggest drivers for active force structure has been support for rotation overseas. Multinational companies and availability of international travel give opportunities for Reserves to serve overseas.

Administrative And Support Elements

The duplication in administrative and support elements would be eliminated by merging these functions into the administrative and support elements of the respective services.

PERSONNEL POLICIES

Personnel policies must be merged to insure manning levels can be sustained in the volunteer force. These policies must also provide incentives for services.

Tours Of Duty

Personnel movement within the military would be slower than in the current system and would be based primarily on personal and career broadening requirements. Current Active Duty personnel policies move individuals on a three to four year basis. This policy was driven to a certain extent by the large overseas presence that was maintained during the Cold War.

Career Progression

This model provides the military with two career paths, active and Reserve, but the intent is to allow movement between these career paths much like the movement in the Reserves today between active status and reserve status. By allowing movement between the two paths, it is possible to get the best of both. Good performers, who decide to pursue alternate careers, have the opportunity of continuing service and perhaps returning to service later with a much broader perspective.

Time in grade would be increased to reflect increased time to retirement and to help with stability of the force. Time in grade should be seen as an opportunity to become an expert in your job rather than a penalty for poor performance.

Retirement

Retirement rules would change to provide equality between active and Reserve service with sufficient incentives to encourage enlistment and retention. Under present rules Active members can retire after 20 years. Reservists earn retirement after 20 years of service, but do not receive benefits until age 60^{xxxii}. Both receive more money for more service. Typically, active members, who retire after 20 years, find other jobs.

Rules need to reflect longer work age and give credit for service. The active retirement needs to be changed to be more in line with civilian programs. The mandatory retirement age should be changed to reflect the civilian world. Eligibility for retirement could be adjusted for service. Retirement pay could also be adjusted for service. For example, using a point system where one weekday of work counts as one point, we could give double credit for service away from home or on weekends, and five times the point value for actual combat time. A robust example is provided in [Appendix B](#).

Pay

Pay increases would be based on grade and points earned with pay graduated within a given grade based on points. The scale would be set to encourage participation without requiring promotion to get more pay. In other words, a Captain with 18 years of points might get more pay than a new major with 15 years of points.

CULTURES MUST MERGE

Active and Reserve cultures must merge in a way that preserves both. The active duty culture is one of a professional military focused on day-to-day sacrifice in service of country. The reserve culture is also of a professional military, but it is focused on sacrifice only when needed in time of war. Both are necessary as in this new era of OOTW. Merging the reserve culture with the active duty culture will create a more stable force that is more closely tied to society and better suited for peacetime. See [Appendix C](#).

ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION

The proposed structure for Reserve forces offers benefits that go beyond cost savings, but there are significant obstacles to overcome.

BENEFITS

Budget savings come primarily from the elimination of duplications in the command, administration, and support functions; however there are other benefits to be considered including better integration for operations, more efficient use of high value assets, and a more adaptable Active/Reserve force mix.

Integration

Integration of forces is one of the key elements of modern warfare. In the past integration of Reserve units has occurred at the unit level causing problems because of seams in command and control. Studies have cited the Air Force Reserve Associate concept in the Air Mobility Command as an example for better integration, but this concept has been rejected for combat units because of these command and control issues. Merging Reserve and Active structures provides integration by eliminating command and control issues.

Efficiency Of Manning

High value assets, such as the B-2 and F-22, can benefit from merging Reserve and Active forces. Increased reliability and performance allow our modern weapons systems to operate almost around the clock; however peacetime manning does not provide sufficient crew or command and control personnel for 24 hour wartime operations. Merging solves this problem by providing the additional manning required for real world operations while maintaining the peacetime efficiencies of the Reserve.

Adaptability Of Force Mix

Downsizing points out two major problems with separate Reserve and Active units. (1) When the decision is made to reduce force structure, Active units and Reserve units must be closed in parallel to maintain force mix. (2) If forces are being moved to the Reserves, Active units must be closed and Reserve units

opened. This is a costly process that merging Active and Reserve forces makes more efficient. If all units are a combination of Active and Reserve, force mix can be maintained during downsizing by simply closing units while changing the force mix can be accomplished by changing the ratio of Reserve to Active within units without closures.

OBSTACLES TO CHANGE

In the course of interviews with DOD leaders several issues were identified that may represent major obstacle to this change.

Our Different Cultures Make It Difficult

Merging active duty and reserve cultures is the biggest hurdle to overcome. The tendency to resist a change in culture is natural in any society and the military is no different as evidenced by time it has taken to accept Goldwater/Nichols. Since this change may be seen as absorbing the Reserve into the Active, there will be a tendency on the part of leadership to ignore the reserve culture.

The key to success in the merging of these cultures is a command structure that includes both Active and Reserve leadership. Incentives such as changes in pay scales may also be beneficial because Reserve forces may be viewed as better paid than the Active.

Inertia Is Difficult To Overcome

The second biggest obstacle is the sheer inertia of the system. Our system is so massive that a decision to change does not insure implementation. Getting consensus for a change of this magnitude will be difficult. Even with consensus, moving the change through the system will take time.

Inertia must be overcome with a good plan that allows the change to evolve over time. Early implementation may be possible on a test basis in units that are in the process of transition into new equipment.

US Codes Have To Change

Although US Codes do not prevent an integrated solution, they do offer significant obstacles because of their complexity. A major revision of the Code should be accomplished as part of any major restructuring. Consensus between Active and Reserve leadership would help move changes through Congress.

Politics Will Play A Role

Merging Active and Reserve components will be a political problem. Merging means a certain amount of consolidation that implies additional downsizing. Logical decisions as to locations for consolidation have the same level of difficulty as base closings. The National Guard may complicate political issues if this change is seen as taking forces away from the Guard.

A commission similar to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission may be the best answer to this problem.

Budget pressures will continue to drive changes in our force structure. Planning offers the opportunity to influence the direction of change to insure it provides benefits rather than problems.

DUPLICATIONS AND SEAMS IN THE PRESENT STRUCTURE

Today, our military forces are composed of over 1.5 million active personnel and over 3.4 million reserve personnel organized into Reserve and National Guard components. Over the years the active and reserve components have developed different cultures and their own command/administrative structures. Although this structure has served us well in the past, these differences create duplications in structure and seams in command and control that affect cost and performance. Based on Congressional direction to eliminate duplication and provide better integration of Reserve forces, merging the Reserve with the Active forces is the best alternative of those considered.

MERGING RESERVE AND ACTIVE FORCES

A conceptual representation of the proposed structure helps identify benefits, disadvantages, and issues for implementation. At the lowest level, units would be composed of both "full-time" active and "part-time" Reserve personnel with the ratio based on the level of operational tempo and readiness required. The entire command structure would be manned by both Active and Reserve personnel including the Joint Staff, theater, and unified commands. Administration and support functions would be consolidated under the individual services. Personnel policies change to incentives volunteer manning levels.

BENEFITS AND OBSTACLES

We found that there are other benefits besides eliminating duplication and improving integration including efficiencies in manning and increased adaptability with regard to force mix. Assuming a decision

were made to execute the restructuring, we judge the biggest obstacle to be the differences in culture with Reserve representation in the command structure providing the best opportunity to overcome the problem.

We are obligated to the taxpayers of America to provide the best possible military for our country. But more importantly, what will happen if we don't change? Tomorrow's budget does not have room for excess force structure and new weapons systems. We must create a military that is sized and structured around the next generation weapons systems in order to maintain our place in world order. Manning must include Reserve personnel because they cost less in times of peace, but they remain trained for duty in time of war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Bottom Up Review

There is a good possibility that there will be another Bottom Up Review (BUR) in 1997 following our Presidential elections. Reconsideration of our two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) force structure is predictable. The Reserve components should consider discussing this concept with their respective services prior to the BUR.

Further Study Required

This study does not address actual cost savings nor does it focus on the services other than the Air Force. Cost saving data would be valuable in selling the concept to both the services and Congress. Studies focused on the other services are essential because of differences between the services that may make this concept unacceptable for them.

Air Force Manning

This study points out the value of Reserve personnel for war time manning of advanced weapon systems such as the F-22 and JSF. Consideration should be given to manning these units with a combination of Reserve and Active personnel regardless of the decision to merge these components.

RESERVE CATEGORIES

The US Codes^{xxxiii} use the following terminology to describe the various categories

1. Ready Reserves are those eligible for recall to active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve is further broken down based on the level of training received.

a. Selected Reserve - Generally contains members who are ready to deploy with minimum training. The Code breaks the Selected Reserve into:

i) Paid Strength - includes those receiving full training (and pay) to maintain status. This category is further broken down into:

(a) Reserve status - includes Reserve and Guard personnel required to participate at least 48 training periods each year plus two weeks of active duty.

(b) Active status^{xxxiv} - includes Reserve and Guard personnel on active duty to support and train reserve forces.

ii) Individual Mobility Augmentee (IMA) - is not mentioned in the US Codes, but is used by the services for individuals who are required to train, but not at the same level as other Selected Reserve. Typically, IMAs are assigned to staff positions.

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - is a special category. Active members separating from their service may be placed in the IRR to fulfill their total military obligation and are eligible for recall. Three references were found in the US Codes that appeared to address members in the health care field. These individuals are required to have 30 days of initial training and then 5 days a year for the remainder of their commitment. Within the numbers reported by service, this category may be considered unpaid Ready Reserve.

2. Standby Reserves is a special category. The original intent may have been to maintain recall capability over certain individuals who left the military, fulfilled all obligations of the Ready Reserve, did not enter the Retired Reserve, but were considered essential to National Security. It now includes members who have military obligations, but are given exemption from the Ready Reserve for reason.

3. Retired Reserves include all former members who have requested transfer upon their retirement, retain their status as Reserves; and are otherwise qualified.

Although this breakdown is not simple, it is further complicated by inactive lists. Reserves who are on the inactive status list of a reserve component, or who are assigned to the inactive Army National Guard or the inactive Air National Guard, are in an inactive status. Members in the Retired Reserve are in a retired status. All other Reserves are in an active status. Our sense is that inactive lists contain individuals eligible for retirement at age 60, who have not requested to maintain in some active level of reserve status. [Return to Chapter Two](#).

EXAMPLE OF RETIREMENT RULES

The following example of retirement rules is provided for discussion: The minimum retirement age is changed to 25 years of active duty service for an active retirement and age 70, adjusted for service, for Reserve retirement.

All retirements would be calculated on points, one point for each day of service during the week and two points for each day of service on weekends and holidays. Days spent in peace keeping operations or remote assignments would count double for both pay and retirement age. Days spent in a designated combat zone would count five times for both pay and service. In other words, a member that served five years in peace keeping operations would be eligible for retirement at age 20 with the same pay as 25 years. A member that spent 1 year in combat could retire at age 21 with 25 years service.

Theoretically a member could spend five years in a combat zone and retire. Reserve retirement would work the same way except that for each point accrued, a day would be subtracted from the retirement age. A Reserve member with 20 years worth of points would be eligible for retirement benefits at age 55.

Actual retirement pay would be calculated based on 2% per year of points times average base pay in the last year of service. In other words, any person who accumulates 25 years of active duty points could retire immediately at 50% of final base pay.

A minimum of 10 years of service and five years of points would be required to become vested in a Reserve retirement. A person who gets out with five years worth of points could not receive benefits until age 65. Return .

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

The conditions of separateness before mobilization and subservience after, have contributed to tensions between the Active and reserve components. In *Antagonism Between Active and Reserve Components in Historical Context*^{xxxv}, Col. Charles Heller, USAR, provides an excellent perspective of the tension between the Army and its reserve components. His perspective may also be applied to the other services. Col Heller tends to focus on leadership issues which can be connected directly to cultural differences.

From the analytical point of view these cultural differences have developed because of the social differences between active and Reserve members. Active members tend to associate within the military community to a greater extent than Reserve members. Active personnel tend to be moved every three to four years. They often live either on base or in an area that is densely populated with military families. They generally work longer hours and spend more time away from home. By contrast, the typical Reservist or Guardsman may see fellow members only when he comes on base to train. Deployments are generally infrequent and may be considered a welcome relief from the civilian job. The Reserve member will generally move only because of civilian employment. Reserve duty is, however, just like a second job. Members of the Selected Reserve spend at least one weekend a month and two weeks a year training with their units. Members in positions requiring regular training, such as aviation, are required to participate even more, as much as 120 days a year. Deployments are more frequent now, than ever.

Professionally, the active duty member may feel that he is in a better position to perform the mission. After all, it is his or her full-time job. It is difficult to think that someone who trains only once, twice, or even eight times a month as your equal in job performance. The Reserve performance is based on training and experience. The average age of the Reserve member is between 30 and 40 years for all reserve components except the Maine Corps Reserve. The average for the active member is between 25 and 30 years. The majority of Reserve members have prior active duty experience. The Reserves tend to hire members leaving the Active ranks because they are already trained. Reserve component units and members may not perform at the same level as their regular counterparts on day one, but that gap rapidly disappears with time on duty. Comparisons, when both active and reserve component units are given time to prepare, generally favor the reserve component because of the experience we bring to the table.

Cultural differences do have an impact. Their impact disappears the closer and longer Reserve members work with their active duty counterparts. Return.

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ENDNOTES

ⁱ Owens, William A., "The American Revolution in Military Affairs," no. 10 (Winter 95-96), pp. 37-38

ⁱⁱ Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Jul 94,

<http://call.army.mil:1100/call/handbooks/94-4/944toc.htm>

ⁱⁱⁱ Constitution of the United States, Amendment II, <http://www.hax.com/USConstitution.html>.

^{iv} The Constitution does not give legality to "unregulated", para-military organizations in our society that like to call themselves militia.

^v Constitution of the United States, Section 8, <http://www.hax.com/USConstitution.html>.

^{vi} The Army Reserve <http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/factfile/chapter1/army/reserve.html>.

^{vii} USC, Title 10, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/>.

^{viii} USC, Title 10, Chapter 13, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/ch13.html>.

^{ix} USC, Title 10, section 312, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/312.html>.

^x USC, Title 10, Subtitle B - Army, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/subtitleB.html>.

^{xi} USC, Title 10, Subtitle C - Navy and Marine Corps, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/subtitleC.html>.

^{xii} USC, Title 10, Subtitle D - Air Force, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/subtitleD.html>.

^{xiii} USC, Title 14 - Coast Guard, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/14/>.

^{xiv} USC, Title 10, Chapter 11 - Reserve Components, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/ch11.html>.

^{xv} USC, Title 32, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/32/>.

^{xvi} USC, Title 10, section 262, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/262.html>.

^{xvii} USC, Title 10, section 267, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/267.html>.

^{xviii} USC Title 10, section 261, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/261.html>.

^{xix} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, HR 1530, section 411,

<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:h.r.1530:>

^{xx} USC, Title 10, section 268, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/268.html>.

^{xxi} USC, Title 10, section 673b, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/673b.html>.

^{xxii} National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, The RAND Corporation, MR-140-1-OSD, 1992, Chapter 3.

^{xxiii} USC, Title 10, section 153, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/153.html>.

^{xxiv} Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), Department of Defense, 24 May, 1995, Page 2-23.

^{xxv} Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), Department of Defense, 24 May, 1995, Page 2-25.

^{xxvi} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?d104:/temp/~c104p51U:e394822:>

^{xxvii} This study was in response to congressional direction in the National Defense Authorization Act "an assessment of a wide range of alternatives relating to the structure and mix of active and reserve forces appropriate to carrying out assigned missions in the mid- to late-1990s." National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, The RAND Corporation, MR-140-1-OSD, 1992, Chapter 3.

^{xxviii} National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Summary*, The RAND Corporation, MR-140/2 -OSD, 1993, page 15.

^{xxix} National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Summary*, The RAND Corporation, MR-140/2 -OSD, 1993, page 15.

^{xxx} This structure is flexible enough to support a system we had five years ago. Front line units, could be heavy on the active side with just enough reserves to support operations at home and reconstitution. Reserve units would be heavy on the reserve side.

^{xxxi} USC, Title 10, section 687 , <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/687.html>.

^{xxxii} Reserve retirement is calculated on points. Reservist receive one point for each day of active service, but also receive one point for each of the 48 mandatory training periods.

^{xxxiii} USC, Title 10, section 267, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/267.html>.

^{xxxiv} The term “Active status” refers to a reserve member who works full-time for the government. Examples include our current active duty military, Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel; US Navy Reserve Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) personnel; military technicians, such as Air Force Reserve’s Air Reserve Technician (ART) personnel; and Civil Service personnel.

^{xxxv} *Antagonism Between Active and Reserve Components in Historical Context*, Col Charles E. Heller, ROA National Security Report, The Officer, October 1995.